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A MONUMENT TO A REGULATORY SYSTEM 
Norman S. Poser* 
SECURITIES REGULATION. By Louis Loss and Joel Seligman. Boston: 
Little, Brown and Co. 1993. Eleven volumes. Pp. xxv, 5713. $1,295. 
Professor Louis Loss1 has been justly described as "the intellectual 
father of securities law."2 He is also without doubt the foremost 
scholar in this increasingly complex field. His career spans virtually 
the entire era of federal securities regulation. Loss joined the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (SEC) as a staff attorney in 1937, only 
four years after the enactment of the first federal securities legislation, 
the Securities Act of 1933,3 and only three years after the establish-
ment of the SEC. Beginning in 1952, Loss taught at Harvard Law 
School until his retirement from active teaching a few years ago. For-
tunately for us, he has not retired from active scholarship. 
With the publication in 1951 of the first edition of his treatise on 
securities regulation, Loss created and defined the field as a separate 
area of the law, distinct from, although closely related to, corporate 
law. The subsequent history of Loss's treatise both parallels and re-
flects the explosive growth of the securities markets and, not entirely 
coincidentally, of securities regulation. The one-volume first edition 
was followed by a three-volume second edition in 1961 and then by a 
three-volume supplement to the second edition - probably the largest 
"pocket part" ever published - eight years later. During the 1970s, 
Loss took a break from treatise writing to serve as Reporter for the 
American Law Institute's Federal Securities Code, which not only 
codified the six major federal securities statutes4 but also suggested 
solutions to many difficult and unresolved issues. Although never en-
acted into law, the Code has profoundly influenced judicial decisions 
and SEC rulemaking. In 1983 Loss published a marvelously concise 
• Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. A.B. 1948, LL.B. 1958, Harvard. - Ed. 
1. William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law Emeritus, Harvard University. 
2. Stephen Labaton, For the Father of Securities Law, Yet Another Milestone, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 26, 1993, § 3, at 8. 
3. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa 
(1988)). 
4. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa 
(1988)); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended in scattered 
subsections of 15 U.S.C. §§ 77-78 (1988)); Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, ch. 687, 
49 Stat. 838 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 79 (1988)); Trust Indenture Act of 1939, ch. 
411, 53 Stat. 1149 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-bbbb (1988)); Investment Com-
pany Act of 1940, ch. 686, 54 Stat. 789 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80a (1988)); Invest-
ment Advisers Act of 1940, ch. 686, 54 Stat. 847 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b (1988)). 
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and useful one-volume Fundamentals of Securities Regulation, which 
he updated in 1988. 
Thus, while Loss has continued to shape and influence securities 
law using other avenues, twenty-five years have passed since the publi-
cation of the updated second edition of his first treatise. As a result, 
the third edition, writt;en by Loss in collaboration with Professor Joel 
Seligman of the University of Michigan Law School, has been eagerly 
awaited. Publication of this eleven-volume treatise, begun in 1989, 
was completed in 1993. Seligman is a worthy collaborator. Thirty-six 
years younger than Loss, he obviously cannot claim an equally pro-
longed association with the field of securities regulation. Nevertheless, 
as the author of The Transformation of Wall Street, 5 the definitive his-
tory of the SEC, Seligman has experienced the SEC's long and inter-
esting history vicariously. Both authors are superb scholars, and the 
new edition does not disappoint. It is an immeasurable contribution to 
the field and, what is unusual for a legal treatise, a joy to read. 
The earlier editions of Securities Regulation and Fundamentals of 
Securities Regulation have profoundly influenced the law. Since 1969, 
no fewer than thirty-seven Supreme Court decisions6 and countless de-
cisions of the lower federal courts have cited these works. The third 
edition of Securities Regulation is bound to be at least equally influen-
5. JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECUR· 
mES AND EXCHANGE CoMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE (1982). 
6. Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 113 S. Ct. 2085, 2091 (1993); 
Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773, 2789 (1991); Virginia 
Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 111 S. Ct. 2749, 2763, 2768, 2770, 2772-73 (1991); Pinter v. Dahl, 
486 U.S. 622, 637-38, 641-47 (1988); Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 
220, 251, 253 n.9 (1987); Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 656, 659, 661-62, 671 (1986); 
Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Bemer, 472 U.S. 299, 307 n.14 (1985); Schreiber v. 
Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. l, 7 n.4 (1985); Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 
688 n.3, 692 n.6 (1985); Securities Indus. Assn. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 
468 U.S. 207, 218 n.17 (1984); SEC v. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 744 n.14 (1984); 
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660 n.20 (1983); Herman & Maclean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 
381 n.10, 389 n.28 (1983); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 696, 701, 712 n.3 (1980); Chiarella v. 
United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 n.10 (1980); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 
444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979); United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 771 n.2, 773, 775, 778 (1979); 
Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 476 (1979); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 
551, 567 n.21 (1979); SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 116 (1978); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 
U.S. 462, 476, 477 (1977); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 23 n.17 (1977); Ernst & 
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 n.17, 210 n.29, 211, 214 (1976); Foremost-McKesson, 
Inc. v. Provident Sec. Co., 423 U.S. 232, 240 n.11, 241n.12,244 n.19, 255 & n.29 (1976); United 
Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 n.14, 866 n.4 (1975); Blue Chip Stamps v. 
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730, 732, 734 n.5, 738 n.9, 752 & n.75 (1975); Scherk v. 
Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 514 (1974); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. 
Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 128 n.9 (1973); Sennott v. Rodman & Renshaw, 414 U.S. 926, 929, 930 n.4 
(1973); Kem County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 593 n.24, 611 n.11, 
612 & nn.14 & 16 (1973); United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 139 n.13 (1972); Caplin v. 
Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 406 U.S. 416, 425 (1972); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United 
States, 406 U.S. 128, 154 (1972); Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 423 n.3, 
438 n.12, 440 n.73 (1972); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 
(1971); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 382 n.5, 384 n.6, 385 & n.7 (1970); SEC v. 
National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 465 n.7, 470, 471 (1969). 
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tial. A personal reminiscence may illustrate one reason for the magni-
tude of Loss's influence on the law. I first met Loss in 1956 when, 
fortunately enough, I was a student in his Corporations course. My 
clearest recollection of the course today is of Loss reflecting aloud on 
the results of hypothetical lawsuits, some of which would not be 
brought - much less decided - until many years in the future. In 
particular, I recall his comments regarding insider trading, which he 
taught as part of Corporations. Under what circumstances, Loss 
asked, would a "tippee" - a term that Loss invented to denote a per-
son who received a "tip" of nonpublic corporate information - be 
liable under SEC rule lOb-5, 7 the principal antifraud provision of the 
federal securities laws?8 It was by no means clear back in 1956 that a 
corporate officer or director - let alone a tippee - could violate the 
securities laws by trading in the public securities markets while in pos-
session of nonpublic information about his company.9 
The following year, I took Professor Loss's course in securities reg-
ulation. My class notes, which I still have, give an indication of his 
extraordinary wisdom and prescience. Again, he was not content sim-
ply to teach the existing law; he insisted on discussing difficult issues of 
law whose resolution lay well in the future. Many of them have since 
been decided by the Supreme Court: When does a note fall within the 
definition of a "security"?10 How should the sometimes competing 
goals of the securities laws and the antitrust laws be reconciled?11 
How broad is the definition of a "seller" under section 12 of the Secur-
ities Act of 1933, 12 which gives buyers a private right of action against 
sellers under some circumstances?13 What is the relationship between 
the express civil liability provisions of the federal securities laws and 
civil liability implied by the courts under rule lOb-5?14 Is the SEC 
permitted to suspend trading in a security without notice or hearing 
beyond the ten-day period expressly set forth in the statute, by tacking 
on additional ten-day suspensions?15 What is the appropriate statute 
of limitations governing a civil action brought under rule lOb-5?16 
In a similar fashion, Loss and Seligman's treatise concerns itself 
7. 17 C.F.R. § 240.106-5 (1993). 
8. The Supreme Court answered this question nearly 30 years later, in Dirks v. SEC, 463 
U.S. 646 (1983). 
9. The SEC's decision in In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961), was the first case 
to hold that insider trading in the public markets was a violation of rule lOb-5. 
10. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 110 S. Ct. 945 (1990). 
11. See Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963). 
12. Securities Act of 1933 § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1988). 
13. See Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 641-55 (1988). 
14. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983). 
15. See SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103 (1978). 
16. See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773, 2780-81 
(1991). 
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with many unresolved issues as well as with existing law. Securities 
Regulation views federal securities regulation not so much as a body of 
black-letter law but rather as an evolving set of principles and doc-
trines, informed by the past and peering questioningly into the future. 
Just as in Loss's Corporations and Securities Regulation classes, the 
treatise focuses on the uncertainties in the law and the issues that the 
cases have thus far left unresolved. The issue of whether scienter is 
required under rule lOb-5 provides an example. Loss and Seligman 
point out that although the Supreme Court held in the landmark deci-
sion of Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder17 that scienter, or "intent to 
deceive, manipulate, or defraud," 18 is a necessary element of a private 
action brought under rule lOb-5, "[t]he majority opinion in Ernst & 
Ernst is puzzling, and it leaves as many questions as it answers" (p. 
3663). The authors then devote several pages to a provocative discus-
sion of the questions that Ernst & Ernst failed to resolve, including the 
relationship between the meanings of the term scienter under the se-
curities laws and under the common law tort of deceit and whether 
scienter includes reckless as well as intentional conduct (pp. 3663-77). 
The complex and interesting history of federal securities regulation 
goes back to the common law of England and the United States and to 
English statutes of the nineteenth century, as well as to the efforts of 
state legislatures in the early twentieth century to regulate the securi-
ties markets in order to protect investors. Securities Regulation, like 
its earlier editions, helps the reader understand this history. During 
the New Deal era, this history led to the creation of a regulatory sys-
tem that now consists of a highly complex apparatus with its own 
mystique and "common law." The very first paragraph of Chapter 
One sets the tone for what is to follow - and also gives a good idea of 
how well the treatise is written: 
The Securities Act of 1933 did not spring full grown from the brow 
of any New Deal Zeus. It followed a generation of state regulation and 
several centuries of legislation in England. Indeed, the problems at 
which modem securities regulation is directed are as old as the cupidity 
of sellers and the 91111ibility of buyers. [p. 3] 
The next twenty-five pages trace the financial history of England and 
the United States that provided the impetus for securities legislation 
(pp. 3-28). A later subchapter, entitled "The Battle of the Philoso-
phies," discusses the controversy between those who favored substan-
tive or "merit" regulation of distributions of securities and those who 
favored relying principally on disclosing material facts to investors in 
order to ensure the honesty and efficiency of the securities markets 
(pp. 171-224). This controversy ended with the enactment of the Se-
17. 425 U.S. 185 (1976). 
18. 425 U.S. at 193. 
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curities Act of 1933,19 which gave a victory to the proponents of a 
disclosure system. Merit regulation, however, persists in several 
states, including California, which refuses to permit a distribution of 
securities unless the Commissioner of Corporations finds, among other 
things, that the proposed issuance of securities is "fair, just, and equi-
table" (p. 108). 
The treatise's emphasis on the need to understand the historical 
background of regulatory decisions is by no means confined to its in-
troductory chapter. The authors introduce every major topic with a 
discussion of its common law and statutory antecedents. For example, 
the subchapter on market manipulation opens with a description of a 
typical "pool" manipulation of the 1920s and proceeds to discuss the 
English and pre-SEC U.S. manipulation cases, beginning with the first 
English manipulation case in 1814 (pp. 3939-52). This interesting and 
important material provides a proper understanding of the legislative 
history of the prohibition of certain types of manipulative practices 
that is contained in section 9 of the 1934 Act, as well as an under-
standing of the prohibitions themselves.20 The history of manipula-
tion also bears on the meaning of "manipulative or deceptive device or 
contrivance" in section lO(b) of the Securities Act.21 
The treatise also dissects and debates the public policy considera-
tions that inform legislative, administrative, and judicial attempts to 
work out solutions to complex problems involving investor protection, 
competition, market efficiency, and the nation's economic well-being. 
The authors' great interest in the policy considerations underlying the 
securities laws manifests itself throughout the treatise. For example, 
the treatise's material on the establishment of a national market sys-
tem for securities, an explicit goal of the 1975 Exchange Act amend-
ments, includes a policy-oriented - and highly critical - discussion 
of the regulatory restraints that the SEC has placed upon competition 
between stock exchange specialists and over-the-counter market-mak-
ers (pp. 2591-602). 
Furthermore, Loss and Seligman firmly ground their discussions of 
policy in the economic reality of markets. For example, the authors 
introduce the material on the Williams Act - the 1968 amendments 
to the 1934 Act regulating tender offers and related transactions -
with a lengthy discussion of the tender-offer phenomenon and the 
ongoing policy debate between those who believe tender offers enhance 
the efficiency of American companies and those who regard tender 
19. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa 
(1988)). 
20. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 9, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1988). 
21. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § lO(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988). See Schreiber v. 
Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1 (1985) (interpreting similar language in the Williams Act, Pub. L. 
No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454, 457 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1988))). 
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offers as destructive instruments of greedy corporate raiders (pp. 
2123-61). 
Securities Regulation repeatedly - and justifiably - emphasizes 
the continuing relationship between federal securities regulation on 
the one hand and the common law and "Blue Sky" laws - state se-
curities laws - on the other. Before they even begin to describe the 
federal securities laws, the authors devote over one hundred pages to 
tracing the history of the Blue Sky laws and analyzing their provisions 
(pp. 29-152). In this way, the reader becomes aware, not only that the 
enactment of the Blue Sky laws - beginning with a Kansas statute in 
1911 - preceded federal securities regulation, but also that Congress 
based its decision to enact the securities laws during the 1930s in part 
on a perception that the then- existing pattern of state legislation inad-
equately regulated markets that had become national in scope. Fur-
thermore, in connection with the discussion of almost every major 
topic covered by the treatise, the authors refer to the relationship be-
tween the federal securities laws and the common law. 
The treatise's overall organization generally follows that of the ear-
lier editions. In fact, many authors of casebooks and treatises on se-
curities regulation have followed similar methods of organizing the 
materials that Loss first used in the 1951 first edition of his treatise. 22 
Thus, Loss's organization of the subject has become familiar to more 
than a generation of law students. In broad outline, the treatise first 
covers federal regulation of the distribution of securities under the 
1933 Act, including the registration process, as well as definitions and 
exemptions from registration (pp. 315-1589). The Trust Indenture 
Act of 1939 and the SEC's functions under the Bankruptcy Act -
now greatly curtailed by the 1978 amendments to that statute - also 
are covered (pp. 1591-690). The authors then turn to the registration 
and postregistration provisions of the 1934 Act, including reports re-
quired of registered companies, proxy regulation, regulation of tender 
offers, and regulation of short-swing trading by corporate insiders (pp. 
1729-2475). This material is followed by a chapter on regulation of 
the securities markets themselves, including a comprehensive descrip-
tion of the structure of the markets and covering such topics as securi-
ties exchanges, securities associations - the only one is the National 
Association of Securities Dealers - regulation of brokerage commis-
sion rates, and the clearing and settlement of securities transactions, 
and also by a chapter on the regulation of brokers, dealers, and invest-
ment advisers (pp. 2477-3401). An exhaustive treatment of the sub-
jects of securities fraud and market manipulation follows (pp. 3403-
4118). Finally, the treatise covers express and implied civil liability 
22. See, e.g., JAMES D. Cox ET AL., SECURmES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 
(1991); RICHARD W. JENNINGS & HAROLD MARSH, JR., SECURmES REGULATION: CASES 
AND MATERIALS (6th ed. 1987). 
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under the federal securities laws and civil and criminal actions by the 
government (pp. 4119-773). The final 660-page volume is entirely de-
voted to a Table of Contents, Appendixes, a Table of Cases, a Table of 
No-Action and Interpretative Letters, a Table of SEC Releases, and 
Tables of Statutory and Rule Citations. 
The above brief summary, which describes only the principal top-
ics that Securities Regulation covers, does not adequately portray the 
richness and comprehensiveness of the treatise. Furthermore, despite 
its traditional organization, Securities Regulation contains much that 
is new. A substantial portion of the third edition is concerned with 
areas of regulation that either have changed fundamentally since the 
publication of the 1969 supplement to the second edition or did not 
even exist at that time. The new materials include a detailed discus-
sion of the SEC's efforts to establish a national market for securities 
pursuant to its authority under the Securities Acts Amendments of 
1975 (pp. 2548-78); a description of the markets for derivative securi-
ties - that is, stock options and stock index options and futures -
which began with the establishment of the Chicago Board Options Ex-
change in 1973, and of the regulation of these markets (pp. 2602-52); 
and a discussion of federal and state regulation of tender offers, which 
began with the enactment of the Williams Act in 1968 (pp. 2123-309). 
Furthermore, throughout the treatise the authors discuss the interna-
tional aspects of securities regulation, which have assumed unprece-
dented importance during the past decade.23 
The reader will find possibly the best example of Loss and Selig-
man's treatise-writing techniques in the 322-page subchapter on 
"Fraud by Issuers and 'Insiders' " (pp. 3448-770). Unbelievably, 
scarcely more than thirty years have elapsed since the SEC first held 
that trading in the public securities markets by a corporate insider 
who is in possession of material, nonpublic information constitutes se-
curities fraud.24 The law of insider trading has developed since that 
time, based almost entirely on a judicial and administrative gloss on 
the concise and very generally worded provisions of section lO(b) of 
the 1934 Act and SEC rule lOb-5. The authors summarize this ex-
traordinary development: "[I]t is difficult to think of another instance 
in the entire corpus juris in which the interaction of the legislative, 
administrative rulemaking, and judicial processes has produced so 
much from so little" (p. 3485). Furthermore, the United States' pro-
scription of insider trading has had a major influence elsewhere in the 
world: during the past few years every member state of the European 
Community (EC) has outlawed insider trading.25 The premise seems 
23. See, e.g., pp. 743-806, 5016-52. 
24. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). 
25. The Council of Ministers of the European Community adopted an Insider Trading 
Directive (ITD) in November 1989, requiring every member state to adopt national legislation 
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to be that insider trading is inimical to mature securities markets. In 
fact, in one important respect the EC goes further than the United 
States: in order to reduce the opportunities for insider trading, the law 
requires publicly held companies in EC member states to disclose 
promptly and publicly developments that may affect investors' 
decisions. 26 
The treatise's treatment of insider trading, which is combined with 
coverage of regulation of fraudulent disclosures by issuers, exhibits all 
of the characteristics that make Securities Regulation a fascinating as 
well as useful work: discussion of the historical origins of the subject; 
concern with policy; analysis of the relevant statutory provisions, 
rules, and cases; examination of the relationship between the federal 
securities laws and the common law; and discussion of unresolved 
issues. 
The portion of the treatise dealing with insider trading begins with 
a very full exposition of the legal and economic arguments that have 
been made for and against regulating this type of activity. It then de-
scribes how the common law treated insider trading, both before and 
after the enactment of the 1934 Act. Next, it launches into an in-
depth discussion of SEC rule lOb-5, the principal antifraud provision 
of the federal securities laws. This material includes a fifty-five-page 
discussion of three key cases interpreting rule lOb-5 that have shaped 
the law of insider trading: the SEC's decision in Cady, Roberts & Co. 27 
and the Supreme Court's decisions in Chiarella v. United States 28 and 
Dirks v. SEC29 The treatise then covers the scienter requirement and 
the scope of rule lOb-5; rule 14e-3, which prohibits insider trading in 
connection with tender offers; and the sanctions that may be imposed 
for insider trading, including special sanctions imposed by legislation 
enacted in the 1980s (pp. 3448-770). 
The subchapter ends with a discussion of the much-debated ques-
tion of whether the statute should include a definition of insider trad-
ing. Although insider trading is a serious crime, the Exchange Act 
outlawing insider trading by June 1, 1992. Council Directive 89/592of13 November 1989 Co-
ordinating Regulations on Insider Dealing, art. 1, 1989 O.J. (L 334) 30, 32. See NORMAN S. 
POSER, INTERNATIONAL SECURmES REGULATION§ 4.1.2.2 (1991) [hereinafter POSER]. Every 
member state except Germany complied with the ITD by the required date. NORMAN S. POSER, 
INTERNATIONAL SECURmES REGULATION§ 4.2.2 (Supp. 1992). Germany enacted a law mak-
ing insider trading a criminal offense in July of 1994. Ferdinand Protzman, Germany Enacts a 
Ban On Trading by Insiders, N.Y. TIMES, July II, 1994, at C6. 
26. POSER, supra note 25, § 4.1.2.2. The rules of the New York Stock Exchange and other 
U.S. self-regulatory organizations require prompt disclosure of material corporate information, 
unless an exception to the rule can be justified. Under federal securities laws, however, a com-
pany may remain silent or say "no comment." Id. § 4.1.2.2 n.75. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 
U.S. 224, 239 n.17 (1988). 
27. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). 
28. 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
29. 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
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nowhere defines it. 30 Congress amended the Act twice during the 
1980s to increase the sanctions against insider trading, but it refused to 
succumb to pressure to define the offense, leaving this task to the 
courts. Loss and Seligman believe, however, that the time has come 
for a legislative definition: 
With full appreciation of the advantages of the common law's ad hoc 
approach, it still seems clear that the jurisprudence on trading while in 
possession of material nonpublic information has developed to the point 
where it cries out for the kind of philosophic consistency that only stud-
ied legislation can provide. [p. 3762] 
My only reservation about the coverage and organization of the 
treatise concerns the relative sparseness of its treatment of the Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940,31 a statute of ever increasing importance 
as investors shift from direct investment in securities to collective in-
vestment through mutual funds and other types of investment compa-
nies, as well as through other financial institutions, particularly 
pension and profit-sharing funds. In 1994, mutual funds -which the 
Investment Company Act regulates - with one trillion dollars in as-
sets, have almost overtaken banks as both the principal repository of 
household wealth and the supplier of capital to small- and medium-
sized businesses. 32 Commentators have suggested that, as direct in-
vestment by individuals decreases and the focus of regulation shifts to 
the intermediaries, including investment companies, "the need and de-
mand for the more paternalistic forms of regulation become less as 
well."33 , 
Nevertheless, Securities Regulation devotes surprisingly little at-
tention to the Investment Company Act. The treatise briefly summa-
rizes the provisions of the Act in Chapter One as part of its general 
overview of the federal securities laws (pp. 243-65), and several other 
parts of the treatise contain material on provisions of the Act in the 
context of particular regulatory issues. For example, Chapter Two 
covers regulation of the distribution of securities under the Investment 
Company Act, along with regulation of distributions under other 
"special statutes" (pp. 829-46), and Chapter Eleven covers civil liabil-
ity under the Act (pp. 4447-53). One wishes, however, that the trea-
tise had discussed the Investment Company Act in the same 
comprehensive and thorough way as it does the other major federal 
securities statutes. 
The publication of these volumes inevitably raises the question of 
the practical usefulness of the traditional multivolume treatise, of 
which this - despite my one reservation - is such a superlative ex-
30. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77-78 (1988). 
31. 15 U.S.C. § 80a (1988). 
32. See David Hale, Experiment in Democracy, FIN. TIMES (Eur. ed.), Feb. 4, 1994, at 16. 
33. Cox ET AL., supra note 22, at 1326. 
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ample. Three reasons lead me to raise this question. First, legislative, 
regulatory, and judicial changes today follow each other so rapidly 
that a treatise is threatened with obsolescence almost as soon as it is 
published. Annual supplements are of some help but are not a com-
plete solution. This difficulty is particularly evident with an eleven-
volume treatise, as the task of keeping it up to date may be as daunting 
and frustrating as the task of keeping the windows of the World Trade 
Center washed. The authors even had to update the treatise during 
the years that it took to publish it; in fact, supplements to earlier 
volumes were published before its completion. But supplements are 
not enough to save a treatise from almost instant obsolescence. 
Second, no treatise, no matter how thorough and detailed, can 
serve as more than a starting point in researching any important issue 
in a legal field as massive and complex as securities regulation. Re-
search on a particular issue is likely to require a review, not only of the 
relevant statutory provisions - and perhaps their legislative history 
- and caselaw, but also of SEC regulations, administrative decisions, 
releases, and no-action letters, as well as comparable state law 
materials. 
Third, electronic research services, kept current almost on a real-
time basis and immediately available via desktop computer, have 
largely supplanted traditional research methods and, it may be argued, 
have also made the treatise obsolete. 
Such criticisms are valid, it appears to me, only if one takes an 
overly narrow view of the treatise form as simply a compendium of 
legal rules and doctrine. Certainly, the problem of galloping obsoles-
cence cannot be avoided: parts of Loss and Seligman's great work 
already need supplementation. Certainly, anyone researching a partic-
ular securities regulation problem will want to go beyond the text of 
Securities Regulation - although the treatise serves as a wonderful 
starting point for almost any inquiry, as there are very few issues to 
which its authors have not applied their acuity. Moreover, electronic 
services such as LEXIS and Westlaw have a practical usefulness that 
no treatise can replicate - although there is no reason why the trea-
tise and the sources it cites cannot be made available through elec-
tronic means. 
However, this treatise is much more than a compendium of the 
law. Along with a meticulous and prodigious attention to detail, its 
5700 pages provide something that cannot be obtained from an elec-
tronic research service or, in my opinion, from any of the other texts 
- although many of them are excellent - on securities regulation. 
That something is the authors' thoughtful and exhaustive probing of 
the many problems that interest both practitioners and scholars in the 
field. As suggested above, Securities Regulation possesses four salient 
characteristics: first, a strong sense of how the past is a prologue to 
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the present; second, a deep interest in issues that remain to be decided 
in the future; third, a genuine concern for the fundamental policy and 
moral goals of the securities laws, the public interest, and the protec-
tion of investors; and, finally, a sense of the relationship between fed-
eral securities law on the one hand and state statutory and common 
law on the other. 
Securities Regulation is a monumental work. Loss and Seligman's 
treatise stands alone, both in its comprehensiveness and in the depth of 
its scholarship and understanding. Moreover, Securities Regulation is 
pleasurable as well as instructive to read. Every practitioner and 
scholar in the field owes Professors Loss and Seligman a great debt of 
gratitude. 
